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Abstract
Research Question/Issue: This study seeks to understand the circumstances under
which board behavior is affected by gender diversity. The “reasoned action approach”
is used as a lens through which to assess the extent that the behavior of the board
varies with its gender diversity.
Research Findings/Insights: The study uses archival data from a panel sample of
80,395 directorships observed between 1998 and 2012. Boardroom gender diversity
is significantly related to director personal responsibility (board attendance), CEO
accountability, and risk taking. Our findings highlight the key importance of the expo-
sure of male directors to women directors on boards beyond the focal board. This
suggests a positive externality or a spillover effect.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: The empirical findings of this study highlight the
importance of allowing for the operation of social norms when studying boardroom
decision making. Experience gained by male directors of working with women direc-
tors on other boards, beyond the focal board, is shown to enable women directors to
contribute more effectively.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers encouragement to policy makers'
intent on increasing the presence of women on corporate boards. These results point
to a spillover effect: there is an observed impact of women on boards that acts not
only directly on the board on which they sit but also through the network of boards
on which their male counterparts sit.
Video Abstract: https://youtu.be/ZlADhUUdZrA
K E YWORD S
Corporate governance, board of directors, gender diversity, reasoned action approach
1 | INTRODUCTION
There have been calls (Adams, de Haan, Terjesen, & van Ees, 2015;
Hoobler, Masterson, Nkomo, & Michel, 2018; Kumar & Zattoni, 2016)
for more research on the characteristics of female directors and the
contributions they make to company performance. The interest in
evaluating the impact of women on boards is driven not only by an
increased awareness of the importance of diversity and inclusion
(Bartlett & Preston, 2000) but also from a practical desire to improve
corporate governance systems that have all too often come up want-
ing. Whether stemming from the excessive risk taking that surrounded
the financial crisis (e.g., Anglo Irish, AIG, RBS, and Lehman Brothers),
insufficient accounting oversight (e.g., Enron, Olympus, Parmalat,
and Toshiba), poor operational control (e.g., Siemens, Volkswagen, and
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Wells Fargo), or straightforward corrupt practices (e.g., Petrobras and
Samsung), recent experience adds up to a far from perfect record.
In some cases—and the Lehman Brothers company name only
serves to highlight the issue (Adams & Ragunathan, 2017)—the ques-
tion has been asked whether things might have turned out for the
better had there been more women on the board.
The importance of corporate governance is well recognized
(Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The board
of directors plays a key role in corporate governance (Adams,
Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010), and in recent years, the role of female
directors has received particular attention (Adams et al., 2015;
Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009). Although a
gender‐diverse board could be expected to improve board decision
making and hence firm performance (Kumar & Zattoni, 2016), the
empirical evidence has remained inconclusive (Ferreira, 2015; Larcker,
Richardson, & Tuna, 2007). This paper approaches the question
through the lens of the reasoned action approach1 (Fishbein &
Ajzen, 2010), which affords a key role to social norms in the formation
of the attitudes and intentions that determine board behavior. We
argue that the extent to which these social norms (in terms of what is
right under various circumstances) are influenced by the presence of
women on the board will depend on the extent to which they are
taken seriously and allowed to contribute effectively to shaping the
board's norms, attitudes, and intentions.
The gender diversity of the board clearly has the potential to
impact on the social norms of the board (Beaman, Chattopadhyay,
Duflo, Pande, & Topalova, 2009; Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999; Van
Vugt & Iredale, 2013). The novelty of our research is that we allow for
experience of gender diversity on other boards to affect the extent to
which gender diversity impacts on social norms—and hence behavior
—of the focal board. This spillover effect is hypothesized as arising
through some of the male directors on the focal board also having
experience of working alongside women on other boards. This effect
forms a central part of the paper. The impact of gender diversity on
board behavior is measured in terms of outcomes such as the record
of board meeting attendance by individual directors, the performance
sensitivity of CEO separations, and the risk profile of the board's
investment decisions.
The role of the spillover effect in enhancing the effective impact
of women on the board is attributed to the enhanced legitimacy that
they are accorded by male colleagues who have experience of work-
ing alongside female directors on other boards. The issue of individual
women directors being taken seriously is highlighted in Harrison,
Price, and Bell (1998), who drew a distinction between surface‐level
gender diversity and deep‐level gender diversity. The productive
potential of deep‐level diversity is undermined by social categoriza-
tion processes that inhibit the effective operation of the board. The
development of gender‐based fault‐lines within the board (Lau &
Murningham, 1998; Li & Hambrick, 2005) can inhibit the contribution
of female directors to social norms and effective board decision mak-
ing (Kaczmarek, Kimino, & Pye, 2012). The origin of these gender‐
based fault lines may lie in a form of gender stereotyping best summa-
rized by the “think manager, think male” aphorism (Schein, 1975;
Schein, Mueller, Lituchy, & Liu, 1996). This explanation of the bias
against women in senior positions has been further developed by
Eagly and Karau (2002) as role congruity theory. Such biased percep-
tions can lead to a “reactive devaluation” (Ross & Stillinger, 1991),
whereby the contributions of women in senior positions are not taken
as seriously as they merit.
Because female directors are found to be associated with better
monitoring behaviors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Adams &
Ragunathan, 2017; Huse, Nielsen, & Hagen, 2009), we first consider
attendance at board meetings as an observable outcome that relates
to a director's attitude toward monitoring and examine the difference
in this behavior among individual male directors who work alongside
women. We find that male directors who work alongside female direc-
tors on other boards (“externally connected men”) are associated with
better board meeting attendance in the presence of female directors
on the focal board. Our results suggest that the presence of women
on other boards has a “spillover effect” on men's susceptibility to
influence by the social norms of female directors, in terms of
attendance.
We further find that on boards with female directors, the propor-
tion of externally connected men (i.e., working alongside women on
other boards) is positively associated with the performance sensitivity
of CEO turnover, a commonly used measure of CEO accountability.
Overall, we find that the presence of female directors on a board
alongside externally connected male directors is associated with
resource allocation decisions that result in lower firm risk. This analy-
sis is conducted using data on 80,395 directorships in the United
States between 1998 and 2012.
The study contributes to the existing literature in the following
two ways. First, it documents a spillover effect in terms of how effec-
tively female directors influence the social norms and behaviors of the
board. This spillover effect arises from male directors being in contact
with female directors across different boards. The difference in out-
comes is seen in terms of personal responsibility as manifested in board
attendance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), accountability regarding the sen-
sitivity of CEO departures to performance (Chen, Cumming, Hou, &
Lee, 2016; Lucas‐Perez,Mınguez‐Vera, Baixauli‐Soler,Martin‐Ugedo, &
Sanchez‐Marin, 2015), and the risk profile of the board's resource allo-
cation decisions (Mateos de Cabo, Gimeno, & Nieto, 2012).
Second, we contribute to the literature that documents the
business case for gender diversity. In recent years, many countries
have set targets or quotas aimed at improving what had previously
been an underrepresentation of women in the boardroom (Isidro
& Sobral, 2015; Marquardt & Wiedman, 2016; Seierstad, Warner‐
Sderholm, Torchia, & Huse, 2017; Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015).
These decisions were often accompanied by supporting arguments
that alluded to the improved business performance of companies with
more diverse boards (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Campbell &
Minguez‐Vera, 2008; Ellwood & Garcia‐Lacalle, 2015; Francoeur,
Labelle, & Sinclair‐Desgagn, 2008). We strengthen such business case
arguments by providing evidence of a positive externality or spillover
effect arising from the presence of women in the boardroom, which
presents in the form of male directors being more responsive to the
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presence of women on the board if they also serve alongside women
on other boards. In this way, the increased presence of women on
boards promises to deliver a nonlinear impact on board behavior—not
only through the focal board on which they serve but also acting
through the board networks of male directors to validate the presence
of women directors in other companies. Expanded experience of
working with women directors on boards facilitates a “normative legit-
imacy of gender diversity” (Zhang, 2020, p. 442) and helps extend
beyond a superficial level of diversity toward a deep level of diversity
(Harrison et al., 1998).
2 | LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 | Influences of female directors
A key consideration regarding the effective influence of female
directors and the extent to which they are taken seriously emerges in
the work of Harrison et al. (1998), who warned of the difficulties of
going beyond a surface‐level diversity and attaining a truly effective
deep‐level diversity. The potential of deep‐level diversity can be
thwarted by social categorization processes. In terms of the board,
gender‐based fault lines (Lau & Murningham, 1998; Li &
Hambrick, 2005) can constrain effective board decision making
(Kaczmarek et al., 2012). Perceived tokenism, as outlined by
Kanter (1977), is one example of this effect. This is akin to correspon-
dence bias (Gawronski, 2004), except that instead of a person's actions
being incorrectly attributed to their disposition, the gender of the direc-
tor is being incorrectly regarded as an indicator of inappropriate fit. Fel-
low (male) directors perceive a causal model that links a female
director's minority (token) position to the validity of her views. This
leads them to discount the presence, influence, and contribution of
these female directors. This is part of a more general phenomenon
where women in senior positions are regarded with the suspicion that
they are not quite right for the role. This “role congruity” bias (Eagly &
Karau, 2002) is captured in Schein's “think manager, think male” apho-
rism (Schein et al., 1996), whereby characteristics associated with being
male align with those that people associate with a manager but no so in
the case of being female. Such gender stereotyping (Gupta, Wieland, &
Turban, 2019; Schneider, Iseke, & Pull, 2019) leads to biases that mani-
fest in the contributions of female directors being discounted or subject
to reactive devaluation, solely owing to their gender (Ross &
Stillinger, 1991). Female directors consequently find it difficult to be
effective in influencing the prevailing social norms of the board and
hence the board's decisions: they are not given a hearing.
Empirical evidence continues to accumulate in support of the
view that women in senior positions are at a disadvantage in the labor
market when they fail to fit the stereotype (male‐oriented) character-
istics of a manager. For example, Gupta et al. (2019) found that high‐
growth and profit‐maximizing entrepreneurs are perceived to possess
characteristics typical of men, consistent with the “think manager,
think male” aphorism. Schneider et al. (2019) showed, in a cross‐
country setting, that female executives are paid less than male
executives, with the differences more pronounced among external
executive candidates. These authors argue that, despite female execu-
tives being in high demand, women are paid less because of
stereotyping against female executives. Main and Gregory‐
Smith (2018) found that female directors are more likely to have
shorter directorship careers than men. They are more likely to exit the
board once the firm is unable to count them as independent directors
(after 9 years). Once the cloak of independence falls away, female
directors are no longer treated in the same way as their male
counterparts.
As highlighted by Terjesen et al. (2009), social norms acting
through social identity (Kanter, 1977; Westphal & Milton, 2000) can
influence the extent to which women's voices are heard. This then
affects the board's attitudes, intentions, and consequent behavior.
Social cohesion (Westphal & Zajac, 1995) can also produce social
norms on the board in regard to how women are heard. To help orga-
nize our thinking in this context, we adapt Ajzen's (1991) theory of
planned behavior (Figure 1), now generally known as the “reasoned
action approach” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). The origin of this model
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) lies in explaining
intentions to act as being the outcome of both attitudes (beliefs
regarding the benefits and costs of an action) and social norms (per-
ceptions of what should be the course of action with which significant
others would expect one to comply). A later modification by
Ajzen (1988, 1991) added a further consideration, namely, perceived
behavioral control—the extent to which the outcome was within the
power of an individual to determine.
In the context of our study, we are treating the board, not the
individual, as the entity. The board's social norms (reflecting percep-
tions of how significant others would behave) influence the extent to
which female board members are taken seriously and allowed to have
a say, as opposed to being regarded merely as symbolic additions to
the board (Pfeffer, 1982). The extent to which female directors are
able to be effective will, in turn, influence the board's social norms
and hence its attitudes and intentions regarding behavior (e.g., as to
the importance of attending board meetings). Both directly and indi-
rectly, via the board's attitudes, social norms impact on the board's
intentions regarding its decisions. As a result, it is not only personal
behavior such as board meeting attendance but also group (board)
outcomes such as the willingness to replace an underperforming CEO,
or the riskiness of the firm's resource allocation behavior, that are
affected. There is a simultaneity here, with the social norms of the
board both determining the effectiveness of female directors on the
board and those very social norms reflecting the (effective) contribu-
tions of female directors.
This paper investigates whether exposure of male directors to
working alongside female directors on other boards undermines the
role congruity bias (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Arguably, it becomes more
difficult for a male director to discount the contributions and behavior
of a female director when he sees female directors contributing in
other external situations (Alexander, 2012; Beaman et al., 2009;
Heilman, 2001). Echoing Sheridan and Milgate (2005), who pointed to
the importance for senior women of high visibility, it is then more
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difficult to simply attribute positive outcomes to circumstances other
than the contribution of the female director, making it more likely that
women directors will be treated by these men as individuals in their
own right—not merely a situational feature.
The research question being considered in this paper is whether
the experience of working alongside women directors on more than
one board leads to a reduction in any such bias. This then allows the
contributions of women directors to be given more weight in board-
room deliberations, thereby enhancing their influence on the focal
board (Beaman et al., 2009; Heilman, 2001). This influence can be
expected tomanifest in a board's social norms and attitudes to behavior
(see Figure 1). In the empirical estimates that follow, we are limited to
the reduced form of this model and, at this stage, are unable to disen-
tangle the various stages in Ajzen's (1991) model. The model remains,
nevertheless, a useful organizing framework for our approach.
We call the effect of working alongside women on boards other
than the focal board a spillover effect (Dimant, 2015; Wheeler, 1966).
In our analysis of the impact of boardroom gender diversity, a special
effort will be made to allow for the influence of the presence of
female directors on male directors—both those encountered on the
focal board (“internal connection”) and those on any additional boards
on which the male director serves (“external connection”). Thus, both
“internal connections” and “external connections” of male directors to
female directors will be measured.
2.2 | Female influence and attendance behavior
The literature documents differences in behaviors and attitudes
between male and female directors (see Croson & Gneezy, 2009, for an
excellent literature review on gender differences in the general popula-
tion). Adams and Funk (2012) survey core values and attitudes of
directors and CEOs in Sweden and find that the women in their sample
are more benevolent, more universally concerned, and less power
oriented than men. These women are also found to be slightly less
tradition oriented and less risk averse. Evidence shows that female
directors are perceived to be more serious about their directorships
and more conscientious at board meetings (Huse & Solberg, 2006;
Izraeli, 2000; Kaplan, Pany, Samuels, & Zhang, 2009). Empirical evi-
dence also suggests that they are better at monitoring than their male
counterparts (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Adams & Ragunathan, 2017).
We argue that female directors can influence male directors through
establishing a social norm of more conscientious behavior.We consider
“conscientiousness” as a behavioral style of female directors and inves-
tigate whether male directors change their related behaviors when
exposed to the influence of female directors.
Guerrero, Lapalme, Herrbach, and Séguin (2017) defined consci-
entiousness as “an individual's propensity to be dependable and to
strive for achievement.” Although we have no direct method to mea-
sure a director's conscientiousness, we have a way to gauge their
dependability through the flag for board meeting attendance prob-
lems as reported in each firm's annual SEC proxy statement. Board
meetings provide the opportunity for directors to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the executive team, and the information obtained from
these meetings is crucial for the board's monitoring and advising
responsibilities to the company. At the same time, each director incurs
individual opportunity cost of time in order to attend board meetings,
because most directors have other high‐level jobs and activities to
which they could instead devote their time. Therefore, the decision to
attend a board meeting could reflect the director's dedication to the
firm in relation to their other responsibilities (Adams &
Ferreira, 2009). In a similar vein, several studies use director meeting
attendance as an indication of the extent to which individual directors
exert effort in their role at the firm (Cai, Garner, & Walkling, 2009;
F IGURE 1 Board behavior and the reasoned
action approach. This figure is adapted from the
original version in Azjen (1991)
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Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2003; Li & Srinivasan, 2011). There-
fore, director attendance at board meetings represents a rare granular
outcome that allows an individual's attitude toward their role in the
boardroom to be assessed.
This is the line taken by Adams and Ferreira (2009), who found that
female directors are less prone to attendance problems and interpret
this as evidence of female directors being better monitors of the CEO.
These authors also find that fewer male directors exhibit attendance
problems when there is a female presence in the boardroom. Their
results support our narrative that women directors have some influ-
ence over the majority group, that is, male directors. The evidence from
Adams and Ferreira (2009) suggests an “internal influence” where both
male and female directors sit on the same board. However, as explained
above, we also seek to test the spillover effect of any influence on the
social norms of the board through the contact its male directors have
with female directors on any other boards on which these male direc-
tors serve—namely, an “external influence.” Allowing for such a spill-
over effect leads us to our first hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1. Male directors are less likely to exhibit attendance
problems when they are on a gender‐diversified board and are
externally connected with female directors.
2.3 | Female influences and firm‐level outcomes
The literature in the areas of economics, ethics, and organizational
behavior documents evidence that women can behave differently
from men. Specifically, the evidence suggests that women tend to be
more risk averse, are less likely to be overconfident, and exhibit more
independent thinking (Agnew, Balduzzi, & Sundén, 2003; Barber &
Odean, 2001; Beyer, 1990; Gneezy, Niederle, & Rustichini, 2003;
Lundeberg, Fox, & Punćcohaŕ, 1994). Women are also more ethical
and are better at promoting deliberation and communication
(Albaum & Peterson, 2006; Larkin, 2000). These traits suggest that
women are better suited to monitoring roles than men.
Recent research also provides some evidence that female direc-
tors are tougher monitors of the CEO. Adams and Ferreira (2009)
found that female directors are less likely to miss board meetings, are
more likely to hold positions on monitoring committees, and that the
presence of female directors increases the likelihood of forced CEO
departures after poor stock price performance. Gul, Srinidhi, and
Ng (2011) found that female directors improve firm transparency by
increasing public disclosure of corporate information. Prior research
also documents evidence that the presence of female directors is
associated with greater quality and accuracy of financial accounting
information (Clatworthy & Peel, 2013; Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011).
Although it is potentially more difficult for female directors to
directly impact firm‐level outcomes because of their minority or token
status (Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Gregory‐Smith, Main, & O'Reilly, 2014;
Kanter, 1977; Tinsley, Wade, Main, & O'Reilly, 2017), it is possible that
they can have an indirect but no less substantive effect through their
influence on the behavior of male directors. As discussed above, the
reasoned action approach (Ajzen, 1988, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010)
suggests that the intentions that drive action are an outcome of social
norms, attitudes, and perceived behavioral control. Contact with
female directors can affect the behavior of male directors through any
one of these channels—social norms being the most obvious. If so, the
female influence on the board's social norms may not depend simply
on those female members on the focal board (internal influence) but
also on any female directors that the male directors have encountered
in the course of their other directorships (external influence). This is
particularly true if such external contacts reduce the inherent biases
that otherwise undermine the effective contributions of women direc-
tors (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Schein, 1975).
One of the key responsibilities of the board is to monitor the
CEO (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Mace, 1971). CEO turnover, par-
ticularly when the firm performs badly, can be treated as an observ-
able outcome of the monitoring activity of the board. For example,
Weisbach (1988) found that CEO turnover is more sensitive to perfor-
mance in an outsider‐dominated board. CEO turnover also tends to
be more sensitive to performance in firms with a smaller board
(Yermack, 1996) and when the chair's position is separate from the
CEO position (Goyal & Park, 2002). Adams and Ferreira (2009) found
that the presence of female directors increases the likelihood of
forced CEO departures after poor stock price performance. This sug-
gests a positive relationship between effective monitoring and CEO
accountability (turnover sensitivity).
Similar to board attendance, we anticipate a spillover effect
whereby CEO turnover is more sensitive to performance when there
are both internal and external influences of female directors. There-
fore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2. In the face of poor firm performance, the probability
of CEO turnover increases on gender‐diversified boards where
male directors are externally connected with female directors.
Next, we examine the relationship between connected male
directors and risk taking. Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1991) argued that
centralized decision making can lead to either very good or very
poor outcomes. Thus, without checks and balances, firms might be
managed in ways that result in extreme performance outcomes;
that is, firms can become riskier. Although there is evidence that
the presence of female directors is associated with better monitor-
ing (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Clatworthy & Peel, 2013; Gul
et al., 2011) and that monitoring of the CEO is associated with
lower risk (Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005; Li & Tang, 2010;
Minton, Taillard, & Williamson, 2014), recent works fail to find evi-
dence that the presence of female directors are associated with
the reduction in a firm's risk (Adams & Ragunathan, 2017; Sila,
Gonzalez, & Hagendorff, 2016).
To allow for the possible influence of women directors, we postu-
late that the presence of female‐connected male directors can
decrease firm risk taking and potentially more so where male directors
are both internally and externally connected with female directors.
This leads to our final hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 3a. Equity risk measures decrease on gender‐diversified
boards.
Hypothesis 3b. Equity risk measures decrease on gender‐diversified
boards where male directors are externally connected with
female directors.
3 | SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY
For this study, we obtain an unbalanced panel of director‐level data
for Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500, S&P MidCaps, and S&P SmallCap
firms for the period 1998–2012. The sample consists of 80,395 direc-
torships (director‐firm‐years) held by 13,451 directors across 1886
firms. When we consolidate the director data into firm‐level variables,
our final sample comprises 15,982 observations (Table 1).
3.1 | Directorship‐level data
In Panel A of Table 2, we present summary statistics of the character-
istics of all the directorships in our sample. Out of 80,395 director-
ships, 10,719 are held by women (13.3%) and 69,676 (86.7%) by men.
To determine whether a male director is externally connected, we
investigate each male director in each firm year. If, in a particular year,
a male director sits on at least one other board that has female direc-
tors, he is considered to be externally connected with women. Out of
the male directorships in our sample, 22,684 are externally connected
(about 32.6% of the full male sample). Summary statistics of the char-
acteristics of male directors with and without external connections
and the firms where they sit are reported in Panel B of Table 2.
According to Panel A, an average director is about 62 years old
and has an average tenure of 9 years. The variable # Other Director-
ships can be a proxy for director “busyness”—directors having many
TABLE 1 Variable definitions
Panel A: Director‐level variables
D (Male Director) =1 if the director is a man, and 0 if the director is a woman
D (Connected with Women) =1 if the male director sits on the same board as at least one woman in his other directorships, and 0 otherwise
D (Not Connected with Women) =1 if the male director does not know any female director from his other directorships, and 0 otherwise
Director Age Director's age (years)
Director Tenure The number of years that the director has been on the board of directors
Other Board Appointments Number of other directorships held by the director
Absenteeism =1 if the proxy statement reports that the director misses more than 75% of board meetings, and 0 otherwise
Panel B: Firm-level variables
Proportion of Men Externally
Connected with Women
The number of male directors who sit on the same board as at least one woman in his other directorships
divided by the total number of directors
Proportion of Women The number of female directors divided by the total number of directors
Average Director Age The average age of all directors
Average Director Tenure The average tenure of all directors
# Other Directorships The total number of other directorships held by all directors
Board Size The total number of directors
Proportion of Independent Directors The number of directors who are non-executives and do not have any other affiliation with the managers
divided by the total number of directors
Log (Total Assets) Natural logarithm of total assets
Tobin's Q Stock price at fiscal year end times the number of common shares outstanding divided by the book value
of equity
ROA Return on assets, defined as net income divided by total assets
R&D Expenditures Research and development expenditures divided by total assets. Missing values are replaced by zero
Capital Expenditures Capital expenditures divided by total assets. Missing values are replaced by zero
Leverage Total long‐term debt divided by total assets
Total Risk Natural logarithm of daily stock price volatility multiplied by the square root of 250
Systematic Risk The regression coefficient for market returns (using CRSP value‐weighted index) from the single‐factor
market model
Idiosyncratic Risk Natural logarithm of the residuals from the single‐factor market model multiplied by the square root of 250
Diversification The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for sales concentration across business segments.
Stock Performance Average daily stock return
CEO Chair Duality =1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise
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outside directorships may have limited ability to monitor (Fich &
Shivdasani, 2007). It can also be seen as a signal of director ability in
that sitting on multiple boards might indicate that his human capital is
in high demand (Masulis & Mobbs, 2014). On average, a director holds
0.63 external directorships. According to the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, firms are required to disclose in their proxy statement
any director whose attendance is below the 75% threshold. There-
fore, we compute the variable Attendance Problem as a dummy
TABLE 2 Summary statistics (directorship‐years)
Panel A: All directors, male directors, and female directors
All directors Male directors Female directors
Mean StDev Min Max Mean StDev Min Max Mean StDev Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age 61.85 8.21 28.00 98.00 62.54 8.14 28.00 98.00 57.38 7.25 31.00 83.00
Tenure 8.95 6.53 0.00 59.00 9.17 6.71 0.00 59.00 7.56 5.02 0.00 34.00
Other Directorships 0.63 0.95 0.00 9.00 0.61 0.93 0.00 9.00 0.75 1.06 0.00 7.00
Attendance Problem 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
Board Size 9.46 2.24 3.00 23.00 9.38 2.25 3.00 23.00 10.00 2.13 4.00 23.00
% Independent
Directors
0.76 0.13 0.10 1.00 0.76 0.14 0.10 1.00 0.77 0.13 0.17 1.00
Total Assets ($
billions)
8.36 22.10 0.02 334.00 7.89 21.30 0.02 334.00 11.40 26.60 0.03 331.00
Tobin's Q 1.95 1.36 0.40 78.56 1.95 1.36 0.40 78.56 1.96 1.31 0.53 39.12
ROA 0.05 0.14 −5.88 0.78 0.04 0.14 −5.88 0.78 0.05 0.09 −1.66 0.60
Total Risk 0.43 0.20 0.10 2.23 0.43 0.20 0.10 2.23 0.40 0.19 0.10 1.71
R&D Expenditure 0.07 1.53 0.00 237.86 0.07 1.64 0.00 237.86 0.04 0.16 0.00 8.03
Capital Expenditure 0.08 1.44 −0.90 233.99 0.08 1.55 −0.90 233.99 0.05 0.09 −0.68 2.31
Leverage 0.22 0.17 0.00 1.87 0.22 0.17 0.00 1.87 0.23 0.16 0.00 1.87
Observations 80,395 80,395 80,395 80,395 69,676 69,676 69,676 69,676 10,719 10,719 10,719 10,719
Panel B: Male directors with and without external connection to female directors
Male directors without external connection Male directors with external connection
Mean StDev Min Max Mean StDev Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age 62.36 8.73 28.00 98.00 62.91 6.74 32.00 95.00
Tenure 9.56 7.09 0.00 59.00 8.35 5.75 0.00 45.00
Other Directorships 0.11 0.35 0.00 4.00 1.64 0.90 1.00 9.00
Attendance Problem 0.014 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.015 0.12 0.00 1.00
Board Size 9.05 2.18 3.00 23.00 10.05 2.23 4.00 23.00
% Independent Directors 0.74 0.14 0.10 1.00 0.78 0.13 0.10 1.00
Total Assets ($ billions) 5.45 15.60 0.02 334.00 13.00 29.20 0.02 334.00
Tobin's Q 1.96 1.42 0.40 78.56 1.94 1.24 0.41 39.12
ROA 0.04 0.15 −5.88 0.78 0.05 0.12 −5.88 0.78
Total Risk 0.45 0.21 0.10 2.23 0.40 0.19 0.10 1.85
R&D Expenditure 0.08 1.65 0.00 237.86 0.06 1.62 0.00 237.86
Capital Expenditure 0.09 1.54 −0.90 233.99 0.07 1.56 −0.90 233.99
Leverage 0.21 0.18 0.00 1.87 0.24 0.17 0.00 1.62
Observations 46,992 46,992 46,992 46,992 22,684 22,684 22,684 22,684
Note: The sample covers the period between 1998 and 2012. Columns 1–4 of Panel A present summary statistics for all directorship‐years in the sample.
Columns 5–8 (columns 9–12) present summary statistics for the male (female) subsample. Panel B divides male directorship‐years into two subsamples.
Columns 1–4 present summary statistics for male directors without any external connection to female directors. Columns 5–8 present summary statistics
for male directors with at least one external connection to female directors. Descriptions of all variables are in Table 1. Directors' information is from the
RiskMetrics database. Accounting variables are obtained from the Compustat database. Total Risk is calculated using price data from the Center for
Research in Security Prices.
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variable that equals one when directors attend fewer than 75% of the
sum of the total number of board meetings and the total number of
meetings held by board committees on which they serve in each year.
Only 1.4% of the directorship‐years in the sample are reported as
exhibiting attendance problems. This is not surprising given that direc-
tors who have attendance problems are reported in the proxy state-
ment and that this could be detrimental to their reputation.
The other columns of Panel A reveal that female directors are
younger and have shorter tenure than their male counterparts. The
average age of female directors is about 57.38 years, as compared
with 62.54 years for male directors. An average female director has
spent 7.56 years on the focal board, whereas the average tenure is
9.17 years for male directors. These differences in age and tenure are
significant at the 1% level. The level of attendance problems is higher
among male directors than among female directors (significant at the
5% level). Women, on average, sit on larger and more independent
boards. They also sit on boards of larger firms with higher growth
opportunities.
Panel B of Table 2 shows that among male directors, those who
are externally connected with female directors are slightly older and
have shorter tenure. Because the number of external board director-
ships is larger for externally connected men, we investigate the possi-
bility that our results are confounded by the number of male directors
in the robustness tests included in the Online Appendix. Male direc-
tors who have external board connections to female directors also sit
on larger and more independent boards in larger firms. The firms
where the externally connected men work are more profitable and
have lower risk and higher leverage. Consequently, all these charac-
teristics are included in the model, because not accounting for such
differences may cause the results to be biased.
3.2 | Firm‐level data
We consolidate the directorship‐level observations into firm‐level
data and present the summary statistics in Table 3. In columns 1–4 of
Panel A, we present the statistics for the full sample. An average
board comprises nine directors, 70% of whom can be classified as
independent.2 The average proportion of women on the board is
10%, which suggests that there is one female director on an average
board. Compared with this proportion of female directors, the propor-
tion of externally connected males on the board is much higher (28%).
This means that over one quarter of male directors on the board has
at least one external connection to female directors in their director-
ship network.
In columns 5–8 of Panel A, we split the sample into firms without
women directors on the board and, in columns 9–12, into firms with
women directors on the board. The differences between these two
groups are consistent with stylized facts reported in the prior litera-
ture (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, &
Simpson, 2010). Female directors tend to sit on larger and more inde-
pendent boards. Firms with women directors are larger, are more
profitable, and have higher growth opportunities and lower risk. They
also have a higher proportion of externally connected men on aver-
age. This is consistent with Adams and Ferreira (2009), who argued
that lack of access to the professional network could decrease the
opportunities for women to be appointed as directors (Oakley, 2000).
Thus, firms in which male directors have professional connections to
women directors are more likely to appoint women as directors.
Next, in columns 1–4 of Panel B (Table 3), we split the sample
into firms without externally connected men and, in columns 5–8, into
firms with externally connected men. Connected male directors are
more prevalent on larger and more independent boards. The differ-
ences in average tenure and age of directors on boards with and with-
out connected men are small, although univariate results show that
these differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.
3.3 | Empirical models
To test Hypothesis 1, we use probit estimation of whether or not the
director in question is classified by the SEC as meriting an attendance
flag, which is present (=1) when the director attends less than 75% of
all board meetings in that year. To eliminate the possibility that some
directors start their directorship in the middle of the year, we remove
the observations where tenure is less than 1 year. We also include #
Other Directorships, which is the number of other board seats that
each director holds. We anticipate the relationship between number
of external directorships and the attendance problem to be positive,
because directors may face a higher opportunity cost with the
increasing number of directorships they hold (Ferris et al., 2003;
Fich, 2005). Board size may also be positively related to attendance
problems, because large boards may experience a free‐riding problem
(Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992)—failing to attend meetings may
be less noticeable in larger boards. Independent directors may
improve governance and, as a result, improve the attendance behavior
of other directors; thus, the proportion of independent directors may
be negatively related to the attendance problem.
Firm‐level control variables include total assets (in log form),
Tobin's Q, return on assets (ROA), and stock return volatility (in log
form). These firm characteristics may be related to the attendance
problem as, due to concerns for their reputation, directors may be
more likely to attend meetings in larger and more reputable firms
(Masulis & Mobbs, 2014). Additionally, directors may be more likely to
attend board meetings when the firm is operating in a challenging or
volatile environment such as when its performance is poor or when
performance variability is high. Thus, we anticipate that the atten-
dance problem will increase with ROA and decrease with total risk.
Initially, male and female directors are pooled, allowing for a male
dummy variable in order to identify gender‐specific differences:
Pr Absenteei,t =1ð Þ=Φ β0 +β1Male Directori,t +Xi,t + εi,tð Þ: ð1Þ
The probability of absenteeism (denoted by Φ) is explained by the
gender of the director (Male Directori,t) and a set of control variables
(Xi,t). We include a range of control variables capturing firm and
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TABLE 3 Summary statistics (firm years)
Panel A: All firms, firms without female directors, and firms with female directors
All firms Subsample by the presence of women
Firms without women on board Firms with women on board
Mean StDev Min Max Mean StDev Min Max Mean StDev Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Proportion of Men
Externally Connected
with Women
0.28 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.17 0.00 0.90 0.35 0.24 0.00 1.00
Proportion of Women 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.63
# Other Directorships 0.54 0.47 0.00 3.44 0.35 0.35 0.00 2.75 0.65 0.49 0.00 3.44
Board Size 8.99 2.29 3.00 23.00 7.61 1.76 3.00 20.00 9.78 2.19 4.00 23.00
% of Independent
Directors
0.71 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.66 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.73 0.15 0.00 1.00
Average Director Age 60.18 4.25 40.33 77.88 59.96 4.94 40.33 77.88 60.30 3.80 42.60 77.20
Average Director Tenure 9.73 3.99 1.00 34.67 10.16 4.49 1.00 34.67 9.48 3.65 1.00 30.00
Female CEO 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Total Assets ($ billions) 6.20 18.20 0.02 334.00 1.76 3.58 0.02 73.50 8.75 22.30 0.02 334.00
Tobin's Q 2.02 1.33 0.70 9.76 2.11 2.03 0.40 78.56 2.02 1.48 0.41 39.12
ROA 0.04 0.15 −5.88 0.78 0.03 0.21 −5.88 0.78 0.05 0.10 −1.77 0.60
R&D Expenditures 0.08 1.97 0.00 237.86 0.14 3.23 0.00 237.86 0.05 0.36 0.00 29.77
Capital Expenditures 0.09 1.89 −0.90 233.99 0.09 0.16 −0.02 1.02 0.06 0.10 −0.02 1.02
Leverage 0.21 0.18 0.00 1.87 0.19 0.19 0.00 1.52 0.23 0.17 0.00 1.87
CEO Chair Duality 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
CEO Tenure 7.13 7.57 0.00 61.00 8.49 8.57 0.00 61.00 6.36 6.82 0.00 51.00
CEO Turnover 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Total Risk 0.45 0.21 0.10 3.06 0.52 0.23 0.15 3.06 0.41 0.19 0.10 2.07
Systematic Risk 1.30 0.63 −0.56 5.13 1.48 0.71 −0.50 5.13 1.20 0.56 −0.56 4.99
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.39 0.19 0.08 3.04 0.45 0.21 0.12 3.04 0.35 0.17 0.08 2.04
Observations 15,982 15,982 15,982 15,982 6,130 6,130 6,130 6,130 9,852 9,852 9,852 9,852
Panel B: Firms without externally connected male directors and firms with externally connected male directors
Subsample by connection with women
Firms without men externally connected to
women
Firms with men externally connected to
women
Mean StDev Min Max Mean StDev Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Proportion of Men Externally Connected
with Women
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.21 0.05 1.00
Proportion of Women 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.57 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.63
# Other Directorships 0.10 0.16 0.00 1.33 0.67 0.45 0.07 3.44
Board Size 7.51 1.80 3.00 15.00 9.42 2.24 4.00 23.00
% of Independent Directors 0.64 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.73 0.15 0.00 1.00
Average Director Age 59.28 5.11 40.33 77.20 60.44 3.93 42.33 77.88
Average Director Tenure 10.62 4.70 1.00 30.60 9.46 3.72 1.00 34.67
Female CEO 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
Total Assets ($ billion) 1.28 2.68 0.02 60.70 7.64 20.40 0.02 334.00
Tobin's Q 2.17 1.79 0.40 36.19 2.02 1.68 0.41 78.56
ROA 0.03 0.17 −3.88 0.55 0.04 0.15 −5.88 0.78
(Continues)
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governance characteristics. Industry and year dummies are also
included in all specifications. The Male Director dummy is subse-
quently split into Externally Connected with Women and Not Externally
Connected with Women. To establish the importance of the spillover
effect, analysis is also conducted on the sample of male directors only.
To test Hypothesis 2, we again conduct a board‐level probit anal-
ysis, but this time using CEO Turnover, a dummy variable equal to one
when the CEO is replaced in any of the subsequent 3 years:
The probability of CEO turnover (denoted by Φ) is explained by the
proportion of men with external female connections (connected men),
the proportion of women on board and a set of control variables (Xi,t).
We also include industry and time dummies. The analysis is run over
all boards and subsequently separately for those boards with women
directors and for those with no women directors.
Finally, we test Hypothesis 3 in the following regression
equation:
We use three measures of equity risk: total risk, systematic risk, and
idiosyncratic risk. Total risk is calculated as the standard deviation of
daily stock returns over the last year. Systematic risk is the coefficient
on the stock market portfolio from a market‐model regression using
the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq/Arca equally weighted index. Idiosyn-
cratic risk is the standard deviation of the residuals from the market
model regression. To annualize total and idiosyncratic standard devia-
tions, we multiply their daily equivalents by the square root of 250.
Total risk is the sum of systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk, the
two main types of risk that are borne by shareholders. Systematic risk
captures the sensitivity of a firm's return to market‐wide conditions,
whereas firm‐specific risk captures the impact of other events that
affect each specific firm. Examining these three risk measures allow us
to present a complete view of whether the presence of connected
male directors can influence risk taking of our sample firms. The key
variable is again the Proportion of Men Externally Connected with
TABLE 3 (Continued)
Panel B: Firms without externally connected male directors and firms with externally connected male directors
Subsample by connection with women
Firms without men externally connected to
women
Firms with men externally connected to
women
Mean StDev Min Max Mean StDev Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
R&D Expenditures 0.09 0.72 0.00 29.77 0.08 2.21 0.00 237.86
Capital Expenditures 0.09 0.19 −0.69 2.79 0.09 2.14 −0.90 233.99
Leverage 0.17 0.19 0.00 1.87 0.22 0.17 0.00 1.74
CEO Chair Duality 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
CEO Tenure 9.19 9.39 0.00 61.00 6.54 6.85 0.00 55.00
CEO Turnover 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Total Risk 0.51 0.22 0.14 2.23 0.43 0.21 0.10 3.06
Systematic Risk 1.44 0.68 −0.30 5.12 1.26 0.61 −0.56 5.13
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.44 0.21 0.12 2.19 0.37 0.18 0.08 3.04
Observations 3,695 3,695 3,695 3,695 12,287 12,287 12,287 12,287
Note: The sample covers the period between 1996 and 2012. Panel A presents summary statistics for all firm years in the sample (columns 1–4), a subsam-
ple of firms with female directors on board (columns 5–8), and a subsample of firms without female directors on board (columns 9–12). Panel B presents a
subsample of firms without any externally connected male director (columns 1–4) and a subsample of firms with externally connected male directors (col-
umns 5–8). Descriptions of all variables are provided inTable 1. Board characteristics are constructed using the information from the RiskMetrics database.
Accounting variables are obtained from the Compustat database. Stock return and risk measures are calculated using price data from the Center for
Research in Security Prices.
Pr CEOTurnoveri,t+3 = 1ð Þ=Φ β0 + β1Proportion ofMenExternally ConnectedwithWomeni,t +Xi,t + εi,tð Þ: ð2Þ
RiskMeasurei,t =β0 + β1Proportion ofMenExternally ConnectedwithWomeni,t +Xi,t + εi,t: ð3Þ
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Women. Analysis is run over all boards and then separately for only
those boards that have women directors and only those boards with
no women directors. As above, various board characteristics are
included as control variables (Xi,t). We also include firm effects, to take
account of the possibility that there are other unobserved firm‐level
factors that can influence both firm risk and the choice of having
externally connected male directors on the board and year fixed
effects in all specifications.3
4 | EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
4.1 | Test of Hypothesis 1: The spillover effect and
board attendance
Table 4 shows the results for the test of Hypothesis 1. In column
1, the coefficient for D (Male Director) is positive and significant at the
1% level, indicating that male directors are more likely to exhibit
attendance problems than their female counterparts. The estimated
probit coefficient (0.121) implies that the average marginal effect of D
(Male Director) is 0.004. Given that the fraction of attendance prob-
lems in our data is 0.014, women are roughly 28.6% (=0.004/0.014)
less likely to exhibit attendance problems than men. This is consistent
with the results in Adams and Ferreira (2009) that female directors
and male directors appear to behave differently in terms of board
attendance. The results in column 2, which splits the male dummy var-
iable by whether or not the director in question is connected exter-
nally to women directors, suggest that such external contact reduces
the male attendance problem. This is further analyzed in detail in the
subsequent columns of Table 4.
Focusing specifically on the behavior of male directors by
restricting the sample to male directors only, column 3 of Table 4 sug-
gests that, in contrast to Adams and Ferreira (2009), there is no signif-
icant relationship between male board attendance and the presence
of women on the focal board. It is worth noting, however, that we can
replicate the significant results of Adams and Ferreira (2009) if we
restrict the sample to their original time period of 1996–20034; how-
ever, over the longer period available for our sample (1996–2012),
the effect is no longer significant.
To test Hypothesis 1 (i.e., whether the attendance of male direc-
tors is affected by the presence of both internal and external connec-
tions to women directors), columns 4 and 5 split male directors by
whether or not they are connected externally to women. When they
are externally connected (column 4), the presence of women on the
focal board is statistically significant.5 In the absence of an external
connection (column 5), the coefficient on the proportion of women on
the focal board is insignificant. Columns 6 and 7 of Table 4 offer a dif-
ferent perspective on this result by separating male directors by
whether or not the focal board contains women directors. In this case,
on boards with women present (column 6), male directors with exter-
nal connections to women directors are significantly less likely to
exhibit board attendance problems. The insignificant coefficient in
column 7 suggests that external connections to women are, in and of
themselves, not sufficient and that it is also important to have the
presence of women on the focal board.
Taken together, these results suggest that we cannot reject
Hypothesis 1. When male directors sit on boards alongside female
directors (column 4), their connections to female directors through
outside boards are associated with a significant improvement in their
attendance record. The estimated coefficient is −0.736, which is equal
to a 17% decrease in the likelihood of the attendance problem. The
results of column 5 suggest that when male directors serve on boards
alongside women directors, there is no significant impact on their
behavior unless they are also externally connected with women direc-
tors through their board network.
From the alternative perspective, among male directors serving
on a board with women present and with external connections to
other women directors, the attendance problem is reduced. The esti-
mated coefficient in column 6 is −0.104, which is equal to a 25.04%
decrease in the likelihood of the attendance problem. Equally, the
results in column 7, relating to the behavior of male directors who find
themselves on boards with no female directors, suggest that their
behavior is unaffected by whether or not they have contact with
women directors through outside boards.
These results are consistent with the finding of Adams and
Ferreira (2009) that male directors have fewer attendance problems in
gender‐diverse boards. However, although results confirm the neces-
sity of the presence of women on the board, they also highlight the
importance of exposure to female directors through service on out-
side boards. When male directors have external connections to
women, they are less likely to have attendance problems on boards
that are themselves gender diverse.
4.2 | Test of Hypothesis 2: The spillover effect and
the performance sensitivity of CEO turnover
The results from the absentee problem estimation discussed above
demonstrate that male directors with external connections to female
directors are less likely to miss board meetings, which suggests that
they may be more conscientious in terms of monitoring. In this sec-
tion, we investigate whether the presence of these connected male
directors actually affects the decision making of the firm. Given that
directors meet only infrequently, the role of the board may not be
obvious in day‐to‐day operations but may be more easily detected in
large and discrete corporate decisions (Levi, Li, & Zhang, 2014). We,
therefore, look at CEO turnover as one possible manifestation of
director monitoring. We argue that the more effective a board is in its
monitoring duties, the more likely it is to dismiss the CEO in bad times
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Mace, 1971).
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 report the probit estimates of Equa-
tion 2 on the sample of all firms. In both columns, the coefficient on
the presence of a woman on board, D (With Women), is insignificant,
suggesting that, by itself, the presence of women on the board has no
impact on the performance sensitivity of CEO replacement. Neverthe-
less, in underperforming companies (column 1), the results show a
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positive relationship between the Proportion of Men Externally Con-
nected with Women and CEO Turnover, significant at the 5% level. The
result in column 1 appears to indicate that CEOs are more likely to be
replaced in bad times when there are more male directors with exter-
nal connections to women, whether or not there is any female direc-
tor on board.
TABLE 4 Director absenteeism
Male directors
Not
All directors All men
Connected with
women
Connected with
women
Boards with
women
Boards without
women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D (Male Director) 0.12***
(0.04)
D (Externally Connected with
Women)
0.09* −0.10** 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
D (Not Externally Connected
with Women)
0.14***
(0.05)
Proportion of Women −0.27 −0.74** −0.04 0.05
(0.20) (0.36) (0.24) (0.30)
# Other Directorships 0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.05* 0.03 0.03* 0.08*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Board Size 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Proportion of Independent
Directors
−0.15 −0.15 −0.08 0.10 −0.17 −0.22 0.10
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.21) (0.15) (0.16) (0.19)
Tenure −0.01*** −0.01*** −0.01** −0.01 −0.01** −0.01** −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age −0.01*** −0.01*** −0.01*** −0.01** −0.01*** −0.01** −0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log (Total Assets) −0.03* −0.03* −0.02 −0.08*** 0.01 −0.01 −0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Tobin's Q −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.00 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
ROA 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.16 0.20 0.06
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.18) (0.11)
Total Risk 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.11 0.10 −0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Director Compensation −0.00*** −0.00*** −0.00*** −0.00 −0.00*** −0.00*** −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 80,395 80,395 69,676 22,684 46,992 46,407 23,269
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06
Note: This table reports director‐level probit estimates of Absenteeism, which is a dummy variable set to be equal to one when the proxy statement reports
that the director attends less than 75% of board meetings and zero otherwise. D (Male Director) is equal to one for male directors and zero for female direc-
tors. D (Connected with Women) is a dummy variable that equals one when a male director has at least one external connection to women and zero other-
wise. D (Not Connected with Women) is a dummy variable that equals one when a male director does not have any external connection to women and zero
otherwise. A male director is considered to have an external connection to women when he sits on other boards on which there is at least one female
director. Proportion of Women is the number of female directors divided by the number of all directors on board. Industry and year dummy variables are
included in all specifications. Other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlations
within director‐level clusters.
*Statistically significant at 10%.
**Statistically significant at 5%.
***Statistically significant at 1%.
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However, when we divide our sample based on the presence of
women on the focal board (internal connections), the results again
indicate the interaction effect between internal and external connec-
tions to women. In columns 3 and 4, the sample comprises firm years
where there is at least one female director on board. The coefficient
for the Proportion of Men Externally Connected with Women remains
statistically significant for underperforming CEOs in column 3. In con-
trast, in columns 5 and 6, when we use the sample comprising firm
years without any female director on board, the corresponding coeffi-
cient is not statistically different from zero.
The difference in the economic effects is also large. We compare
two hypothetical firms, one where 50% of the male directors are
connected (Firm A) against another where none of the male directors
is connected (Firm B). In column 1, we calculate predicted probabili-
ties and find that the probability of an underperforming CEO being
dismissed in bad times, keeping all other control variables at their
mean is 22.95% for Firm A and only 16.22% for Firm B. These differ-
ences are more pronounced in boards overseen by women directors
(column (3)).
Overall, these results suggest that CEOs on gender‐diverse
boards are more likely to be replaced in bad times when the male
directors on the board are externally connected with women. This
lends support to the interpretation that, consistent with Hypothesis 2,
the interaction of male directors with women directors outside and
inside a specific board leads to more conscientious monitoring via
higher CEO turnover in bad times.
TABLE 5 CEO turnover
All boards Boards with women Boards without women
Firm performance Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good
Dependent variable = CEO Turnover (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of Men Externally Connected with Women 0.49**
(0.22)
0.14
(0.21)
0.64***
(0.24)
0.35
(0.25)
−0.14
(0.46)
−0.58
(0.40)
D (With Women) 0.10
(0.07)
0.07
(0.07)
# Other Directorships −0.36***
(0.11)
−0.19*
(0.11)
−0.47***
(0.13)
−0.27**
(0.13)
0.07
(0.22)
0.14
(0.20)
Board Size −0.03
(0.07)
0.14**
(0.07)
0.07
(0.10)
0.28***
(0.11)
−0.36**
(0.18)
−0.14
(0.13)
Board Size Squared −0.00
(0.00)
−0.01**
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
−0.01***
(0.01)
0.02*
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
Proportion of Independent Directors 0.47**
(0.20)
0.20
(0.19)
0.77***
(0.26)
0.40
(0.26)
0.07
(0.32)
0.02
(0.31)
Log (Total Assets) 0.07***
(0.03)
0.04
(0.03)
0.06**
(0.03)
0.01
(0.03)
0.08
(0.05)
0.09*
(0.05)
Total Risk 0.20**
(0.09)
0.14*
(0.09)
0.21**
(0.11)
0.08
(0.11)
0.27*
(0.15)
0.26*
(0.14)
CEO Tenure −0.01**
(0.00)
−0.01**
(0.00)
0.00
(0.01)
−0.00
(0.01)
−0.02***
(0.01)
−0.01**
(0.01)
CEO Age 0.03***
(0.00)
0.03***
0.00)
0.04***
(0.01)
0.02***
(0.01)
0.04***
(0.01)
0.04***
(0.01)
Female CEO 0.21
(0.16)
−0.06
(0.17)
0.25
(0.17)
−0.03
(0.17)
Diversification −0.06
(0.04)
−0.06
(0.04)
−0.07
(0.06)
−0.04
(0.05)
−0.06
(0.07)
−0.11
(0.07)
CEO/Chair Duality −0.42***
(0.06)
−0.47***
(0.06)
−0.43***
(0.07)
−0.45***
(0.07)
−0.47***
(0.10)
−0.55***
(0.10)
Observations 4,174 4,125 2,774 2,620 1,400 1,505
Pseudo‐R2 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.10
Note: This table reports probit estimates of CEO turnover on the proportion of male directors who sit on the same board as at least one female director in
their other directorships and control variables. The dependent variable (CEO Turnover) is a dummy variable set to one if the firm experience a change in
CEO within the following three years and zero otherwise. Firm performance is defined as bad (good) when profitability (as proxied by return to assets) is
below (above) firm‐level median. Industry and year dummy variables are included in all specifications. Other control variables are defined in Table 1. Stan-
dard errors (in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlations within firm‐level clusters.
*Statistically significant at 10%.
**Statistically significant at 5%.
***Statistically significant at 1%.
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4.3 | Test of Hypothesis 3: The spillover effect and
equity risk
We have shown that male directors in the presence of female direc-
tors behave differently in terms of their own attendance when they
are also externally connected with women in their other directorships.
We have also shown that the presence of such female‐connected
male directors can explain firm‐level monitoring in terms of the per-
formance accountability of CEO turnover, again when the focal firm
has at least one female director on the board. In this section, we relate
TABLE 6 Risk taking
All firms Boards with women Boards without women
Total
risk
Systematic
risk
Idiosyncratic
risk
Total
risk
Systematic
risk
Idiosyncratic
risk
Total
risk
Systematic
risk
Idiosyncratic
risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Proportion of
Men
Externally
Connected
with Women
−0.07**
(0.03)
−0.10*
(0.06)
−0.07**
(0.03)
−0.10***
(0.04)
−0.10*
(0.06)
−0.09***
(0.04)
−0.05
(0.06)
−0.23
(0.14)
−0.04
(0.06)
D (With
Women)
−0.00
(0.01)
−0.02
(0.02)
−0.00
(0.01)
# Other
Directorships
0.05**
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.04)
0.05***
(0.02)
0.06***
(0.02)
0.06
(0.04)
0.06***
(0.02)
0.04
(0.03)
0.23***
(0.08)
0.03
(0.03)
Board Size −0.01*
(0.00)
−0.02***
(0.01)
−0.01**
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.00)
−0.01**
(0.01)
−0.03**
(0.01)
−0.01**
(0.01)
Proportion of
Independent
Directors
−0.03
(0.03)
0.01
(0.07)
−0.04
(0.03)
−0.03
(0.04)
0.05
(0.08)
−0.05
(0.04)
−0.00
(0.06)
0.06
(0.13)
−0.03
(0.06)
Log (Total
Assets)
−0.08***
(0.01)
0.04*
(0.02)
−0.11***
(0.01)
−0.09***
(0.02)
−0.03
(0.03)
−0.11***
(0.02)
−0.03*
(0.02)
0.22***
(0.04)
−0.08***
(0.02)
Tobin's Q 0.00*
(0.00)
0.04***
(0.01)
−0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.00)
0.05***
(0.01)
−0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.03***
(0.01)
−0.00
(0.00)
ROA −0.20***
(0.03)
−0.39***
(0.06)
−0.20***
(0.03)
−0.41***
(0.05)
−0.54***
(0.10)
−0.42***
(0.06)
−0.15***
(0.03)
−0.32***
(0.07)
−0.15***
(0.03)
R&D
Expenditures
−0.01
(0.01)
−0.03*
(0.02)
−0.00
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.02)
−0.08***
(0.03)
−0.00
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.02)
−0.01
(0.01)
Capital
Expenditures
0.01
(0.01)
0.03**
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)
0.07
(0.05)
0.22
(0.14)
0.03
(0.04)
0.01*
(0.01)
0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)
Leverage 0.17***
(0.04)
0.09
(0.08)
0.21***
(0.04)
0.16***
(0.04)
0.06
(0.09)
0.20***
(0.05)
0.10
(0.06)
0.02
(0.13)
0.14**
(0.06)
Log
(1 + FirmAge)
−0.31***
(0.04)
−0.74***
(0.08)
−0.21***
(0.04)
−0.26***
(0.05)
−0.56***
(0.09)
−0.16***
(0.05)
−0.51***
(0.07)
−1.11***
(0.17)
−0.41***
(0.07)
Average
Director Age
−0.01***
(0.00)
−0.02***
(0.00)
−0.00**
(0.00)
−0.01***
(0.00)
−0.01***
(0.00)
−0.01**
(0.00)
−0.01*
(0.00)
−0.01*
(0.01)
−0.00
(0.00)
Average
Director
Tenure
0.00*
(0.00)
0.01***
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.01**
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.02*
(0.01)
0.00
(0.00)
Constant 0.90***
(0.17)
4.50***
(0.36)
0.52***
(0.17)
0.83***
(0.25)
4.16***
(0.47)
0.42*
(0.25)
1.20***
(0.28)
4.34***
(0.66)
1.00***
(0.28)
Observations 15,139 15,139 15,139 9,548 9,548 9,548 5,591 5,591 5,591
R2 0.61 0.19 0.60 0.63 0.21 0.61 0.59 0.20 0.59
Note: This table reports results from firm‐level fixed effects estimations of equity risk measures on the proportion of connected men. Total Risk is the natu-
ral logarithm of daily stock price volatility multiplied by the square root of 250. Systematic Risk is the regression coefficient for market returns (using CRSP
value‐weighted index) from the single‐factor market model. Idiosyncratic Risk is the natural logarithm of the residuals from the single‐factor market model
multiplied by the square root of 250. The fixed effects estimations include year dummy variables as controls. Other variables are defined in Table 1. Stan-
dard errors (in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlations within firm‐level clusters.
*Statistically significant at 10%.
**Statistically significant at 5%.
***Statistically significant at 1%.
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the presence of an externally connected male director to firm risk tak-
ing. We use measures of equity risk, or return volatility, as our proxies
for firm risk taking. Return volatility is a standard proxy for risk in the
financial economics literature (Adams & Ragunathan, 2017; Sila
et al., 2016). Equity risk measures capture the riskiness of corporate
investment decisions.
Table 6 presents the results of estimating Equation 3. Again, the
results indicate the interaction effect between the internal and exter-
nal connections of gender diversity. In columns 1–3, we estimate
Equation 3 on the full sample of all firms. Although the variable cap-
turing the presence of women on the board, D (With Women), is statis-
tically insignificant in all three columns (leading us to reject
Hypothesis 3a), we find the coefficients for Proportion of Men Exter-
nally Connected with Women to be negative and statistically significant
at conventional levels for each of the three equity risk measures. This
suggests that the presence of externally connected male directors is
associated with lower firm‐level performance variability. A 10%
increase in the proportion of males with female external connections
is associated with an approximately 0.67% (0.067/10 * 100) decrease
in the standard deviation of returns, a 0.01 (0.1/10) unit decrease in
systematic (market) risk, and a 0.70% (0.07/10 * 100) decrease in the
idiosyncratic risk measure. These coefficients represent modest eco-
nomic effects. As a comparison, column 1 suggests that a 10%
increase in a firm's leverage is associated with a 1.69% decrease in the
standard deviation of returns.
In columns 4–6 of Table 6, we re‐estimate all three risk equations
while restricting the sample to gender‐diversified boards (firm years
where there is at least one female director on the focal board). Consis-
tent with Hypothesis 3b, the estimated coefficients on the externally
connected male directors are negative and statistically significant.
These estimated coefficients also suggest that the economic effect of
additional males with female external connections is larger on boards
with female directors. In column 4, a 10% increase in the proportion
of connected men, for example, an additional director on an average
board of nine people, is associated with 0.95% (0.095/10 * 100)
decrease in return standard deviation, compared with 0.67% in the full
sample. By contrast, when in columns 7–9 we restrict the sample to
the firm years where there are no female directors on the focal board,
the coefficients are no longer statistically significant, although they
remain negative in sign. The overall results suggest that, consistent
with Hypothesis 3b, external connections (i.e., the proportion of male
directors who work with female directors on other boards) matter, but
only when female directors are present on the focal board. Simply
having women on the focal board is not, however, sufficient in itself
to alter risk‐taking decisions.
5 | ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
So far, the external connections of male directors are being treated as
exogenous. However, the possibility of the external connections of
male directors being endogenous must be recognized. An alternative
explanation for our results could be that industry effects lead to a
higher connectivity between male and female directors, with the latter
being no different to their male counterparts, and also being part of
the same network in the firm's industry. To address this concern, we
use a new measure of connectedness that excludes connections of
men and women when working in the same industry. Although the
number of directors with female connections decreases by 31% (from
22,684 to 15,641), our main results still hold across all specifications.
Results are presented as part of the Online Appendix.
We also compute a connectedness measure that excludes any
overlaps of the same male–female directors sitting on the same boards
outside the focal firm. The number of male directors with connections
decreases from 22,684 to 17,216. Our results are robust to this
alternative measure. Results are presented as part of the Online
Appendix.6
We note that external connectedness of male directors may
also be an indicator of the most valued and reputable directors
(Fich, 2005; Masulis & Mobbs, 2014).7 Consequently, the atten-
dance behavior of such directors may reflect their attention to
building and maintaining a reputation rather than the influence
effects of working alongside female directors in various director-
ships. To address these concerns, a range of robustness checks is
performed on the above results. Details are available in the Online
Appendix. These checks include (i) allowing for newly appointed
directors being particularly conscientious, (ii) allowing for a history
of board appointments not reflected in current positions, and
(iii) weighting the effect of external connections to women by the
numbers of women on the various boards. In an additional attempt
to eliminate endogeneity, further estimation is undertaken in the
form of pairwise t-tests that limit the analysis to those situations
where the same director is observed on at least two boards. Finally,
the regressions on firm risk are repeated using generalized methods
of moments, again in an effort to eliminate any effects arising from
the possibility that those observed serving alongside women on
other boards are different in unmeasured ways from other directors.
None of these robustness checks alter our basic result.
6 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We find that director behavior and decision making are affected by
boardroom gender diversity. The observed effects include director
personal responsibility (board attendance), accountability (the perfor-
mance sensitivity of CEO separations), and firm risk taking (share price
volatility). A key finding is that these effects are associated not only
with gender diversity on the focal board but also with male director
experience of working alongside female directors on other boards. In
this sense, we document a spillover effect, whereby a board with male
directors who have experience of working with women directors in
board assignments other than the focal board is measurably more
affected by gender diversity.
Individually, we find that male directors with both internal and
external connections to female directors are less likely to exhibit
attendance problems. More broadly, these same gender diversity
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conditions are found to extend to metrics of board governance
performance—specifically, the extent of CEO accountability for firm
performance and the riskiness of the firm's investment decisions.
CEOs in underperforming companies are more likely to be replaced in
the presence of a gender‐diverse board where the male directors have
some external connections to working with women on other boards.
A similar result is obtained in terms of those firms with gender‐diverse
boards having a lower share price volatility (being less risky).
Based on the reasoned action approach (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010)
as shown in Figure 1, we argue that, on gender‐diverse boards, social
norms and hence behaviors are more susceptible to the influence of
female directors, when male directors have experience of working
alongside female directors—not only on the focal board but also
through their other various directorships (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004;
Cronqvist & Yu, 2017; Pedersen, Keithly, & Brady, 1986). A key factor
in this socially embedded process (Westphal, 1999; Westphal &
Park, 2020) seems to be the external validation through male directors
working alongside female directors on other boards on which they
serve. Such experience seems to undermine any role congruity bias
(Eagly & Karau, 2002; Schein, 1975) or correspondence bias
(Gawronski, 2004; Nier, Bajaj, McLean, & Schwartz, 2013) and the
associated reactive devaluation (Ross & Stillinger, 1991) that other-
wise threatens to undermine the contributions of women in senior
positions such as board directorships. Consequently, in the presence
of male directors who have also worked alongside women directors
on other boards and whose biases originating in gender stereotyping
have been undermined through repeated exposure in different board-
room settings (Beaman et al., 2009), the social norms of the board are
more susceptible to gender diversity. Female directors are thereby
able to make a more effective contribution to the board's social norms
and, from the perspective of the reasoned action approach, on its atti-
tudes and intentions. The result is a context more accepting of gender
diversity (Zhang, 2020) and a boardroom more likely to realize the
benefits of deep diversity (Harrison et al., 1998).
Previous research in this area has largely concentrated on the
impact of women within boardrooms (Adams & Ferreira, 2009;
Lucas‐Perez et al., 2015; Mateos de Cabo et al., 2012). Our results
add to this existing literature by showing that the wider boardroom
experience of externally connected male directors is also important
to the gender debate and provides an additional mechanism
enabling female directors to make an effective difference to board
governance. The key implication of this paper is that female direc-
tors can have an impact on firm‐level outcomes even when they
are in the minority on most boards. Consistent with the work of
Iannotta, Gatti, and Huse (2016), who posited a jointly causal
nature of diversity, what we find is not a direct impact: the pro-
portion of women on boards, in and of itself, is not sufficient to
explain firm‐level outcomes in a statistically significant way. It is
the added consideration of the proportion of male directors who
can draw on the experience of working alongside female directors
in their wider directorship network that proves key.
It is as if what is experienced internally or proximally on one
board (specifically the influence of female directors) is, on its own, too
easily discounted by role congruity bias (Eagly & Karau, 2002) and
gender stereotyping unless these biases are undermined through simi-
lar contributions being witnessed on boards that are more distal. For
those men also encountering women directors contributing on other
more distal boards, the biased filtering out or discounting of the con-
tributions of women directors is more difficult to sustain, thereby
facilitating the impact of female directors on the board's social norms,
as captured in the reasoned action approach (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010).
Thus, this paper suggests a new way in which gender diversity in
boardrooms can be viewed. Given that female representation in the
boardroom is increasing, due to both regulatory and social pressure,
the spillover effect identified here suggests that the impact of such
policy‐induced changes on firm behavior may be more significant than
previously documented.
This positive externality or spillover effect also suggests an impor-
tant policy implication. Improved governance effects resulting from
higher female participation in the boardroom may arise not only from
the direct effect of women being present but also through network
effects whereby fellow male directors who have exposure elsewhere
to working with female directors (on other boards) are more likely to
be influenced by their presence on any given board. Policy efforts
aimed at increasing the presence of women in the boardroom are
afoot in many countries (Bertrand, 2018). The additionality or spillover
effect, which is the focus of this paper, implies that the payoff of such
policies is likely to be nonlinear, impacting not simply on the boards
where increased representation occurs but influencing behavior on
other boards as the number of connected male directors expands and
the behavior of these male directors is affected.
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NOTES
1 This is also known as the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1988,
1991). This theory has been widely used to understand the role of atti-
tudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control in predicting a
variety of behaviors, including health‐related behavior (Armitage &
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Conner, 2000; Conner & Sparks, 1996; Sheeran & Taylor, 2006), adop-
tion of technology (Venkatesh, Thong, & Xu, 2012), career choices
(Vincent, Peplau, & Hill, 1998), and debt consumption behavior (Xiao,
Tang, Serido, & Shim, 2011). This paper uses the reasoned action
approach to understand the decision of male directors to exert effort
when they are exposed to working alongside women directors.
2 Using the RiskMetrics definition of director independence, independent
directors are defined as those directors who have no material connec-
tion to the firm other than a board seat. “Material” is defined as a stan-
dard of relationship (financial, personal, or otherwise) that a reasonable
person might conclude could potentially influence one's objectivity in
the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an
individual's ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of
shareholders.
3 In specifications where the dependent variable is an indicator variable,
that is, the probit models in Equations 1 and 2, we do not include firm
fixed effects owing to the “short” panel (low T relative to N) nature of
the data. This is the so‐called “incidental parameter problem” (see,
e.g., Arellano & Honoré, 2001). In Equation 3, where we employ OLS
instead of probit as the dependent variable is continuous, we include
firm fixed effects.
4 In contrast to the −0.271 coefficient with a p value of 0.47 reported on
the coefficient in Table 4 for our full sample, the restricted time period
of 1996–2003 produces a coefficient of −0.329 with a p value of 0.091.
5 Repeating this analysis in the shorter time period available to Adams
and Ferreira (2009), we find an even stronger relationship, with an
estimated coefficient on the Proportion of Women of −0.832 with a
p value of 0.017. This leads us to surmise that institutional changes
since 2003 may explain the loss of statistical significance over the
longer data series. Specifically, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 sig-
nificantly increases the responsibilities of directors, the scrutiny of
director behavior by regulators and investors, and the risk associated
with the failure to fulfil their director responsibilities (Linck, Netter, &
Yang, 2009). These changes can increase the incentives for directors
to attend board meetings (Masulis & Mobbs, 2014) and weaken the
relationship between the Proportion of Women and board attendance
of male directors.
6 We thank an anonymous referee for these valuable suggestions.
7 It can also be seen as a proxy for a director's “busyness” (Kaplan &
Reishus, 1990), but the results that are consistent with this story would
be opposite to ours.
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